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Evolutionary game theory has become one of the most diverse and far reaching theories in biology.
Applications of this theory range from cell dynamics to social evolution. However, many applications
make it clear that inherent non-linearities of natural systems need to be taken into account. One way
of introducing such non-linearities into evolutionary games is by the inclusion of multiple players. An
example is of social dilemmas, where group benefits could e.g. increase less than linear with the number
of cooperators. Such multiplayer games can be introduced in all the fields where evolutionary game
theory is already well established. However, the inclusion of non-linearities can help to advance the
analysis of systems which are known to be complex, e.g. in the case of non-Mendelian inheritance. We
review the diachronic theory and applications of multiplayer evolutionary games and present the current
state of the field. Our aim is a summary of the theoretical results from well-mixed populations in infinite
as well as finite populations. We also discuss examples from three fields where the theory has been
successfully applied, ecology, social sciences and population genetics. In closing, we probe certain future
directions which can be explored using the complexity of multiplayer games while preserving the promise
of simplicity of evolutionary games.
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INTRODUCTION
Game theoretic reasoning can be traced back to the
Babylonian Talmud [13], but possibly the first mathemati-
cal proof using game theory was about the game of chess
by Zermelo [129, 168]. Typically, the initiation of evolu-
tionary game theory is ascribed to Morgernstern and von
Neumann, who published the first seminal treatise on game
theory [157]. While most of the theory developed therein
is for two-player games, as Nash pointed out [97], it indeed
has a section on multiplayer games. However, the multi-
player games tackled by Morgernstern and von Neumann
were the so called cooperative games where the interacting
players can form coalitions. After developing a theory for
non-cooperative games, where the individuals are driven by
purely selfish motives and no sense of collaboration, Nash
promptly applied it to another famous game, poker [96].
The formal use of game theory in biology can be ascribed
to Fisher, who used indirect game theoretic reasoning to
tackle the question of why sex ratio in mammals usually
tends to 1 : 1 [47]. Mathematical arguments of a simi-
lar form were already presented in the nineteenth century
[39, 41, 42, 109]. For the use of game theory, Fisher was
later explicit in stating [48] ‘The relation between species,
or among the whole assemblage of an ecology, may be im-
mensely complex; and at Dr. Cavalli’s invitation I propose
to suggest that one way of making this intricate system in-
telligible to the human mind is by the analogy of games of
skill, or to speak somewhat more pretentiously, of the The-
ory of Games.’ Lewontin [87] gave a more complete intro-
duction of game theory to biologists, while Maynard Smith
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and Price [91] formally presented what we know of today as
evolutionary game theory.
Although classical game theory originates from economics
[96, 157], evolutionary game theory forgoes a typical as-
sumption of classical game theory: rationality. In evolution-
ary game theory, natural selection is the dominant force.
Individuals are born with fixed strategies. They interact
with each other and receive payoffs according to a payoff
matrix based on their strategies. Strategies which receive
the higher payoff are said to be more successful than those
which do not. These successful strategies spread in the
population at the cost of other less successful strategies.
Understanding this dynamical process is the mainstay of
evolutionary game dynamics [124].
The initial focus of evolutionary game theory was on the
concept of evolutionarily stable strategies [91]. Evolutionary
stability is a refinement of the concept of a Nash equilib-
rium. This leads to ideas such as an ‘unbeatable strategy’
[60] or an ‘evolutionarily stable strategy’ [90]. A strategy is
defined to be ‘unbeatable’ or an ESS if a small number of
individuals playing a different strategy cannot invade a pop-
ulation playing it. While ‘unbeatable’ strategies dominate
all the invading mutants, a weak ESS can allow the invasion
of initially neutral mutants. The notion of evolutionarily sta-
ble strategies was already generalised to multiplayer games
in the early eighties [112].
Knowing if a strategy is an ESS is very useful, but an
important question is if such a strategy is attainable. The
work of Taylor, Jonker and Zeeman [140, 167] extended
the realm of evolutionary game theory to include dynamics,
which led to a straightforward relation to the ESS concept
[67].
Key advances were also made when spatial structure [102]
and finite populations [46, 103, 141] were included in evolu-
tionary games. Addressing spatial structure in evolutionary
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2games sparked a whole field of its own and would need to
be reviewed separately – we thus do not consider spatial
structure here.
Going from infinite populations to finite ones, the ques-
tions changed from evolutionary stability in the determinis-
tic regime to the properties pertaining to fixation, extinc-
tion, maintenance of multiple strategies, etc. The analysis,
however, was mostly limited to two-player games [94, 101].
We highlight recent results obtained in the field of evolution-
ary multiplayer games both for infinitely large populations
as well as finite population.
FROM PAIRWISE CONTESTS TO SOCIAL
INTERACTIONS
The leap from chess to poker was crucial in the devel-
opment of the theory of games. Economics continued with
multiplayer analysis [54, 80, 162] but a similar growth pat-
tern was not reflected in evolutionary game theory. Instead,
the simplicity of evolutionary games helped spread its appli-
cations from genes and cells [16, 17, 21], between individ-
uals or communities [10, 15, 51, 148, 149] and even across
species [116, 155].
However, even complex biological phenomena can be in-
corporated in evolutionary games without compromising the
simplicity of the theory. The past decade saw an explosive
growth in the inclusion of finite population dynamics in evo-
lutionary games [101, 103, 141, 144]. This has substantially
increased the scope of the theory, while leading to beautiful
and simple results in its own right [86, 103]. Similarly, the
consideration of non-linear interactions in multiplayer games
could open new avenues of research. Herein, we list the
current state-of-the-art in evolutionary game theory dealing
with non-linear interactions brought about by multiple play-
ers. Such inclusions have the potential to demonstrate novel
dynamics which is not possible in conventional two-player
games [25, 31, 57].
Replicator dynamics
Traditionally, ‘Evolutionary game theory, [. . .], describes
evolution in phenotype space’ [104]. The different pheno-
typic traits are termed strategies. At the core of evolu-
tionary game dynamics lies the replicator equation. It was
named so after taking inspiration from the concept of ‘repli-
cators’ from Dawkins [40, 126]. For a detailed connection
between the replicator equation and other fundamental dy-
namic equations such as the quasi-species equation and the
replicator–mutator equation, see [111].
The replicator equation allows the frequencies of the dif-
ferent types in the population to determine the fitness land-
scape rather than setting the fitness of each type to be con-
stant (constant fitness being a special case of the replicator
dynamics). Taking a bottom-up approach to the replicator
equation, consider two types in an infinitely large popula-
tion, A and B. The frequencies of the two types are given
by x and 1−x. The interactions between the two types can
be expressed by a matrix such as
( A B
A a1 a0
B b1 b0
)
, (1)
This payoff matrix shows that when an A individual interacts
with another A individual it gets a1 and when interacting
with a B individual it gets a0. From this payoff matrix,
we can calculate the average payoff of both the strategies,
piA = a1x+ a0(1− x) and piB = b1x+ b0(1− x).
We can interpret these average payoffs as fitnesses of the
two strategies directly denoted by fA = piA and fB = piB .
How this fitness actually relates to the payoff is a question
pertaining to the particular context of the model we are
studying, in particular, in finite population this issue can be
of importance [163]. For the time being, we assume them to
be the same. Again, following classical selection ideas if this
fitness is greater than the average fitness of the population,
then the frequency of that type increases over time and vice
versa. These concepts can be formally written down in the
form of a differential equation which tracks the change in x
over time,
x˙ = x(1− x)(fA − fB)
= x(1− x)((a1 − a0 − b1 + b0)x+ a0 − b0) (2)
Thus, the evolutionary game is introduced in the dynamics
via the fitness of the strategies. There are three possible
solutions to this equation, strategy A goes extinct, x = 0
or the whole population consists of A players, x = 1 and
lastly when the two strategies have equal fitness, fA = fB
[24] which is when
x∗ =
b0 − a0
a1 − a0 − b1 + b0 . (3)
See Fig. 1 for a summary of the possible dynamics.
1. Equilibrium points in multiplayer games
For general multiplayer games, the story is a bit more
complicated, and hence let us begin with the simplest case
of three players, still with the above two strategies A and
B. As before, the frequencies are given by x and 1 − x
but now the interactions are given by the following payoff
matrix:
(AA AB BB
A a2 a1 a0
B b2 b1 b0
)
, (4)
where the focal individual is denoted by the row player.
Since it is a three-player game, there are two other play-
ers, who are denoted as the column players. They can
be either AA, AB, BA or BB. Herein, we assume that
playing with an AB is the same as playing with BA.
Thus, the labels A and B matter, but not their order-
ing. If the ordering of players would matter, then we
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FIG. 1. Possible outcomes in a two-player game and comparatively in a three-player game with two strategies A and B.
Since the selection gradient fA − fB for a two-player game is linear, the possible outcomes can include at most one internal
equilibrium point, which can be either stable or unstable. Increasing the number of players increases the complexity of the
dynamical equation by making the selection gradient non-linear. For a three-player case the equation is a quadratic polynomial
and can hence contain at most two internal equilibrium points, which can be alternatively stable and unstable.
would have two different payoffs entries for AB and BA.
In this simple case, increasing the number of players in-
creases the number of payoff entries. The average pay-
offs of the two strategies are a polynomial function of the
frequency, piA = a2x
2 + 2a1x(1 − x) + a0(1 − x)2 and
piB = b2x
2 + 2b1x(1 − x) + b0(1 − x)2. Again, as before,
equating fitness with payoff we can write down the replicator
equation,
x˙ = x(1− x)(fA − fB) (5)
= x(1− x)(x2(a0 − 2a1 + a2 − b0 + 2b1 − b2)
+2x(−a0 + a1 + b0 − b1) + a0 − b0).
Again, there exist two trivial roots, x = 0 and x = 1, as
previously but now there is a possibility of two more roots
to exist, as the payoff difference is polynomial of degree 2 in
x (Fig. 1). We can immediately extend this analysis to an
arbitrary number of d players, where the possible number of
roots (except the trivial) can be d−1 [64]. For a game with
two strategies, tracking the frequency of a single strategy
provides all the information about the dynamics. For a game
with n such strategies, we need to know the time evolution
of n − 1 variables. Hence, for any d player game with n
strategies, the dynamics proceeds on an n− 1 dimensional
simplex. Since in each dimension the number of equilibria
possible in the interior are d−1, in all there can be (d−1)n−1
distinct internal equilibria at most [56, 61].
In evolutionary game theory, fixed points of the dynamical
system are the particular composition of strategy frequen-
cies where all the strategies have the same average fitness.
Interpreting these fixed points biologically, they predict a
co-existence of different types in a population and the main-
tenance of polymorphism. The study of the properties of
such equilibrium points has a long-standing history in clas-
sical game theory, evolutionary game theory and popula-
tion genetics [3, 24–26, 32, 74, 78]. The number of fixed
points is an important property of each concrete system,
but what is the generic number of fixed points in a sys-
tem? More precisely, what is the probability that we will
have a system with a certain number of fixed points? This
can be analysed by an exhaustive study of the maximal
number of equilibrium points of a system and the attain-
ability of the patterns of evolutionarily stable strategies in
an evolutionary system, both analytically and numerically
[27, 33, 54, 61, 74, 76, 90, 154].
A method for addressing such general questions is via the
study of randomly drawn evolutionary games. If the payoff
matrices are drawn randomly from an arbitrary distribution
then we can ask the question, what are the probabilities of
observing a certain number of (stable) equilibria? For such
randomly drawn two-player games with n strategies (such
that all payoff entries are drawn from the same distribution),
the probability that there exists an isolated internal equilib-
rium is 21−n and the probability that a given equilibrium is
stable is at most 2−n. For n = 2 this is exactly equal to
1/4. Extending such analysis to multiplayer games, we see
that given an equilibrium for a d player two-strategy game,
the probability of it being stable/unstable is just 1/2. For
d player games with n strategies, the probability of having
a given number of equilibria has been calculated explicitly
for several given cases, but not yet in closed form across
4the number of players. For example, the probability that a
three-player game with two strategies has two internal iso-
lated equilibria is analytically determined to be 61450 ≈ 0.136
and well corroborated by simulations [61].
This analysis in addition to the translation of the game
theoretic framework to population genetics helps us draw a
number of parallels. For example, going back to classical
population genetics [74, 75, 121, 122], a current study on
multiplayer games [61] provides a proof of the conjecture
put forth by Karlin and Feldman on the maximum number
of fixed points in a deterministic model of viability selec-
tion among n different haplotypes. While the evolutionary
game theory-based proof requires the assumption of random
matching, an alternative approach presented by Altenberg
[3] proves the conjecture in all its generality.
From infinite to finite populations
The replicator dynamics describes the dynamics of strat-
egy frequencies in an infinitely large population. Clearly,
this is an approximation. It has been well acknowledged
that the studies in finite population have the capacity to
challenge the results based on the infinite population as-
sumption [49, 104]. Early on, using principle from the
philosophy of science, Thomas and Pohley [141] demon-
strated the shortcomings of the classical ESS theory when
applied to finite populations. The classical concept of
an ESS is shown to be neither necessary nor sufficient to
describe evolutionary stability in small finite populations,
while for large populations it is necessary but not sufficient
[103]. Since then, there has been a rapid development in
the field of finite population analysis of evolutionary games
[8, 52, 56, 65, 69, 71, 83, 86, 106, 142, 145, 146, 163–
165, 169]. We begin by introducing stochastic dynamics for
two-player games and then generalise the results for multi-
player games.
Moran process
The replicator dynamics can be viewed as a limiting deter-
ministic case for a variety of stochastic processes. For finite
populations, we can imagine a number of different micro-
scopic processes for the transmission of strategies. Choosing
the pairwise comparison process as a microscopic process re-
sults in the imitation dynamics in the limit of infinitely large
population sizes [142, 143]. For our purpose, we will focus
on a variant of the Moran process. The classical Moran
process proposed in evolutionary theory [95] is a one-step
process with a constant population size. The Moran process
in evolutionary game theory [139] usually consists of picking
an individual according to its fitness for reproduction and
then picking another individual randomly for death. The
reproducing individual begets an offspring with the same
strategy as its own, and the individual chosen for death is
removed from the population. As these events take place in
the same time step, the population size is conserved. Fit-
ness determines the probability of an individual to be chosen
for reproduction. Thus, the transition probabilities of such
a process are given by
T+j =
jfA
jfA + (N − j)fB
N − j
N
T−j =
(N − j)fB
jfA + (N − j)fB
j
N
(6)
while the system remains in the same state with probability
1−T+j −T−j . The concept of an intensity of selection is by
no means new to evolutionary theory. However, tradition-
ally, the selection coefficient was just the relative difference
between the fitness of two types. In evolutionary game the-
ory, we consider an independent variable which controls the
effect of selection. Following the logic from the previous
paragraph, fitness would determine the probability of re-
production. Hence, the selection term is introduced when
calculating the fitness from the payoff. Our earlier assump-
tion of fi = pii thus no longer holds, but rather the fitness
is a non-decreasing function of the payoff. The importance
of the game for fitness is controlled by the selection inten-
sity, which we term as w. We can thus tune the intensity of
selection to control the impact of the game on the fitness.
When selection is weak, all strategies have almost the same
fitness while for higher intensities of selection, the game
matters.
Fixation probability
For games where the mutations rates are very low, an
individual with a new strategy can either go extinct or go to
fixation [52, 165]. Calculating the probability of fixation of
such a new mutant is very useful in studying the dynamics
of the spread of strategies. Hence, in a population of size N
consisting of N − 1 B individuals and a single A individual,
the probability ρA1 that it will take over the population is
given by [79, 101],
ρA1 =
1
1 +
∑N−1
k=1
∏k
j=1
T−j
T+j
. (7)
Under neutrality, T−j = T
+
j , the fixation probability is sim-
ply that of a neutral mutant, 1/N . This is a well-known
result in classical population genetics for the fixation prob-
ability of a neutral allele [55, 81].
The game enters the dynamics via the inclusion of fit-
ness which in the above case is packaged via
T−j
T+j
= fBfA , as
the transition probabilities given in Eqs. (6). Hence, now, it
matters how the fitness function maps the payoffs and selec-
tion intensity to fitness. Assuming a linear payoff to fitness
mapping, we have fS = 1−w+wpiS . This leads to the ratio
of transition probabilities
T−j
T+j
= 1−w+wpiB1−w+wpiA . Further, we as-
sume that selection is weak w  1. This simplifies matters,
as it corresponds to a linear approximation with the neutral
case as a reference. There are various ways in which we can
5interpret why selection would be weak in the first place even
without an external parameter governing selection intensity
[138]. This simplifies
T−j
T+j
= 1−w+wpiB1−w+wpiA ≈ 1− w(piA − piB).
Alternatively, we can define fS = exp[wpiS ], in which case
without the assumption of weak selection we have a sim-
pler form of
T−j
T+j
= e−w(piA−piB). From these approaches,
we see that the quantity of interest is the difference in the
payoffs, which actually forms a condition for the derivation
of further results.
With this setup now we can ask the traditional question
of evolutionary stability but in finite populations. The use
of fixation probability to characterise evolutionary stability
was first implemented in [103]. Two questions are of key
importance in determining the potential of a strategy to
take over the populations:
(i) When is the fixation probability of a strategy greater
than neutral (One-third rule)?
(ii) When is the fixation probability of a strategy greater
than the fixation probability of the other strategy
(Risk Dominance)?
Tackling the first point for two-player games leads to a
beautiful inequality popularly known as the one-third rule,
ρA1 > 1/N if x
∗ < 1/3, (8)
which holds for a wide range of evolutionary processes [70,
86, 103, 145]. In words, this means that assuming a large
finite population with random matching, selection favours
strategy A replacing the resident strategy B if the internal
equilibrium x∗ (as defined in Eq. 3) is less than one-third.
Tackling the second point for two-player games, strategy
A will replace strategy B with a higher probability, that is
ρA1 > ρ
B
1 than vice versa if Na0 + (N − 2)a1 > (N −
2)b0 + Nb1. For large enough populations, this is simply
a0 + a1 > b0 + b1. Analogous results to this condition
exist in a deterministic setting as well which were discussed
in [73]. This condition is also holds true for the Moran
process with a variety of birth–death processes under weak
selection and for some special processes for any intensity of
selection [7, 103].
Performing a similar analysis for multiplayer games, albeit
via more complicated mathematics, yields the generalisation
of the so-called one-third rule and the risk dominance con-
dition [56, 83]. For large but finite populations,
(i) the fixation probability of a strategy is greater than
neutral for a d player game, ρA1 > 1/N if the condition∑d−1
k=0(d− k)ak >
∑d−1
k=0(d− k)bk is fulfilled, and
(ii) the fixation probability of A is large than the one of
B, ρA1 > ρ
B
1 , if
∑d−1
k=0 ak >
∑d−1
k=0 bk.
The condition for overcoming neutrality is now no longer
connected to the equilibrium point explicitly as was in the
two-player case making the one-third rule special. Further-
more, this result is valid for all processes within the domain
of Kingman’s coalescence [85]. While the one-third rule is
derived under weak selection, for strong selection the evo-
lutionary stability criterion for finite populations becomes
equivalent to the evolutionary stability condition in infinite
populations [67, 101, 145]. For intermediate selection in-
tensities, the fixation probability can have at most a single
maximum or minimum [166].
Fixation time
Another interesting property of the dynamics in finite
populations is the average time to fixation. Specifically,
the times of interest are (i) the unconditional fixation time
(the average time required to reach any of the boundaries,
all A or all B) and (ii) the conditional fixation time (the
average time required to reach a given boundary given that
it is reached). Expressions for these times are available from
standard textbooks on stochastic processes [44, 79]. Quite
often, we are interested in fixing a strategy in a population.
The expression for the conditional fixation time is then use-
ful as it is the time required for a mutant to reach fixation
given that it does reach fixation. Starting with a single A
individual, we have the conditional fixation time
τA1 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l
ρAl
T+l
k∏
j=l+1
T−j
T+j
. (9)
As described above, the game is introduced via T−j and T
+
j
(that also enter in the fixation probability ρAl ) which is a
ratio of transition probabilities which in turn depend on the
payoff-determined fitnesses of the strategies. Under weak
selection, the form of both the unconditional and conditional
fixation time has been derived for a variety of processes
[5, 163]. In particular for the conditional fixation time the
first-order series expansion is of the form,
τA1 ≈ [τA1 ]w=0 + w
[
∂
∂w
τA1
]
w=0
. (10)
The zeroth-order term is N(N−1) while the first-order term
was explicitly calculated for two-player games e.g. in [5].
Interestingly, for a strategy which always has a fitness ad-
vantage that varies with the frequency, the first-order term
can be positive. This means that even though a strategy
has a fitness advantage it takes longer to fix than a neutral
mutant. This seemingly counterintuitive case is analysed in
detail in [4, 6]. Performing a similar analysis for multiplayer
games involves first calculating the first-order term. For d
player games, the first-order correction can be exactly calcu-
lated for a given process or in more general terms [163]. For
example, for the Moran process with an exponential payoff
to fitness mapping, fS = exp[wpiS ], we have[
∂
∂w
τA1
]
w=0
= N
N−1∑
i=1
∆pi(i)[i(HN−1 −Hi−1 −HN−i)
+NHN−i]− Γ(2 +NHN−1) (11)
6where ∆pi(i) = piA(i)− piB(i), Hi =
∑i
k=1 1/k is the har-
monic number and Γ is a function of the payoff parameters,
see Eq. (S13) in [56]. Analysing this effect in multiplayer
games, we see that increasing the number of players can in-
tensify the effect of this so-called stochastic slowdown [166].
Mutation selection equilibrium
For intermediate mutation rates [165], a new mutation
can occur even when the first mutation is at an interme-
diate frequency. This results in a polymorphic population,
and the concept of fixation is not very useful anymore for
characterising the system. In this case, the success of a
strategy can be characterised by the average frequency of
a strategy in the mutation selection equilibrium or in short,
the average abundance. By success we mean that in the
average abundance of a strategy is greater than that of the
other. An alternative approach based on a limiting case
of vanishing noise [50] was employed for the the stochastic
stability of three-player games in [72]. This approach can
also be extended to spatial games [92, 93].
The average abundance of a strategy for arbitrary muta-
tion rates and weak selection was derived explicitly by [7].
An extension of the same model for multiple strategies fol-
lowed [9]. The derivation of the result depends heavily on
neutral coalescence theory [82, 159]. Hence, the results can
only be viewed as weak selection approximations. Extend-
ing the analysis to multiplayer games, it is possible to write
down the average abundance of a strategy for a game with
e.g. three players [57], a closed form for an arbitrary number
of player games has not been obtained yet.
For two-player multiple-strategy games (and population
structure as well), transforming the results for the average
abundance into a slightly different form, it is possible to con-
dense all the information about the process and the popula-
tion structure under weak selection into a single variable, the
so-called structure parameter σ [137]. Then, the condition
for A to be more abundant than B is σa1+a0 > b1+σb0. In
case of well-mixed populations we have σ = (N−2)/N . As
N → ∞ we have σ = 1 recovering the standard condition
for risk dominance. Different σ-values have been calculated
for a variety of evolutionary games with two strategies in dif-
ferently structured populations in [137]. The use of such a σ
parameter results in a single inequality capable of determin-
ing whether a strategy had a higher average abundance in
the mutation selection equilibrium, a result that can further
be extended to multiple strategies in structured populations
[138]. For d player games, it can be shown that instead of a
single σ parameter we would require d−1 such σ parameters
to capture the effects of the process [166]. For example, the
condition that strategy A is more abundant than B requires∑
0≤i≤d−1
i 6=i∗
σiai + ai∗ >
∑
0≤i≤d−1
i 6=i∗
σibd−1−i + bd−1−i∗ .(12)
For game dynamics in a large well-mixed population when
mutations are negligible, the condition for higher abundance
reduces to risk dominance.
APPLICATION OF MULTIPLAYER GAMES
Due to its generality, the replicator equation encompasses
a variety of biological contexts from ecology to population
genetics and from prebiotic to social evolution [126] and
hence became a popular tool amongst behavioural ecolo-
gists, population geneticists, sociologists, philosophers and
also back among economists [123, 124, 150]. This similar-
ity sometimes allows us to transfer results from one field to
another [61, 147]. Probably, one of the first applications
of multiplayer game theory was to the war of attrition pro-
vided by [59]. In the following section, we will see how not
just evolutionary game theory in general, but also multi-
player evolutionary games in particular pervade a plethora
of disciplines from ecology to social sciences.
Ecology
From a dynamical systems point of view, the continu-
ous time frequency-dependent selection equations from pop-
ulation genetics, the Lotka-Volterra equations from ecol-
ogy and the replicator equations all are closely related
[35, 36, 67, 111, 118, 132]. The set of replicator equa-
tions for n strategies is mathematically equivalent to the
well-known Lotka-Volterra equations for n − 1 species in
ecology [67]. The dynamical equations developed by Lotka
and Volterra pre-date the replicator equation by almost half
a century [88, 156]. Hence, in a sense, ‘Ecology is the god-
father of evolutionary game theory’ [67].
An important development in the theoretical understand-
ing of multiple interactions in animals was pushed forth by
the introduction of biological markets [98–100]. Empirical
evidence from the wild about coalition formation and multi-
party interactions is available for almost a century now rang-
ing from cormorants [19] to killer whales [134].
A long-standing question in a complex ecology is the evo-
lution and maintenance of biodiversity [89]. If nature is
red in tooth and claw as often envisioned through natu-
ral selection, then the persistence of many different species
together requires an explanation. One way in which multi-
ple species and their interactions have been analysed is via
multiplayer games [38]. However, instead of calling these
interactions as multiplayer, one should consider them as in-
terspecies interactions [128] (although they can of course
be understood using the same dynamical equations as for
multiplayer games). If more than two individuals of the
same species interact with each other, then we call this a
multiplayer game. However, it is of course possible that
multiple players of one species interact with multiple play-
ers of another species. For example, we can have interac-
tions between many cleaner wrasses and their client. For
each cleaner fish, it interacts with one client fish at a time
and hence we can consider this as a two-player game. In
this case, the interactions within species are ignored [128].
However, this simplifying assumption can be relaxed [127]
leading to further complications. As an example, we discuss
simple mutualistic interactions between two species (exclud-
7ing self interactions) where more than two individuals are
interacting.
Consider two species A and B. It was shown previously
[23] that if the two species are locked in a mutualistic re-
lationship with each other, then the species which evolves
slower can get a larger share of the benefit. The interaction
occurs between two different species. In each species, we
have two different types of individuals, the generous ones
G and the selfish S. The generous individuals contribute
to the mutualistic endeavor, while the selfish withhold some
contribution. Since the interaction is assumed to be mu-
tually beneficial, both species being selfish is not a viable
option. However if one of the species evolves slower than
the other, the slower evolving species can get away with
being selfish while forcing the other to be generous. This
shares some similarity with extortioner strategies recently
found in repeated two-player games [66, 117]. The effect
was termed as the Red King effect as opposed to the Red
Queen from classical ecology where there is pressure on a
species to evolve faster.
While this analysis was based on two-player games, mu-
tualism can also be explored using multi-partner interac-
tions [12, 98]. Multiplayer games make the dynamics and
in turn their solutions non-linear. This changes the size of
the basins of attraction of the equilibria in which one of the
species is selfish while the other is forced to be generous.
Ultimately, this can reverse the Red King effect [58].
Furthermore addition of multiple players provides a way
of extending the analysis in a variety of ways. Threshold
effects (where a certain number of cooperators are necessary
to generate a public good, see e.g. [1, 114]), asymmetric
number of players and their interactions with asymmetric
growth rates can be explored which reveal a rich dynamics
that is possible in mutualisms.
Population genetics
While ecology was a natural playground for playing evo-
lutionary games, population genetics was not far behind.
Often, evolutionary games are described as a theoretical
framework for describing dynamics at the phenotypic level
[104], but the similarity of the dynamical equations used
with those of population genetics did not go unnoticed.
Early on, the comparisons between game theoretic rea-
soning and standard population genetic models were ex-
plored. For example, the famous example of Fisher on sex
ratios was revisited in [131] and the fundamental theorem of
natural selection in [132]. Even diploidy was incorporated
using multiplayer evolutionary games [121, 122] although
they were not named so. In general, we can thus approach
population genetics with two different views, with either the
game dynamics given by the gene dynamics or as a dynam-
ics on the phenotypic level which occurs based on a known
genetic setup.
Biological interactions can be highly non-linear [130]. Es-
pecially the non-linear epistatic nature of genetic interac-
tions is a recent subject of interest. Thinking of strategies
as alleles can help apply some of the results of game the-
ory directly to population genetics. This approach usually
restricts the analysis to haploid populations. Yet, recent
evolutionary game theory has been successful in deriving re-
sults for the equilibrium points [61] and fixation probabilities
and fixation times in diploids [63]. The use of multiplayer
evolutionary game theory as was employed by Rowe [122]
attributes each genotype a different strategy. Two-player
evolutionary games can be used to address population ge-
netic effects of drive elements [147]. We provide an exam-
ple for an application of multiplayer games in population
genetics which is able to handle non-linearities and non-
Mendelian inheritance patterns, for example, the dynamics
of the Medea allele.
Medea is a naturally occurring selfish genetic ele-
ment. Natural Maternal effect dominant embryonic arrest
(Medea) alleles were first discovered in Tribolium flour
beetles [22] and have also been reported in the mouse
[115, 160]. They derive their ability to invade populations
by maternally induced lethality of wild-type offspring not
inheriting a Medea allele (Fig. 2) [158]. Thus, the wild-
type homozygous offspring of the heterozygous mother die
with a certain probability. This uniparental effect on the
fitness of the offspring distorts the inheritance pattern from
the usual Mendelian inheritance. Understanding how Medea
works has been a subject of interest in population genetics
for long. It has been looked upon as a method of introduc-
ing transgenes into parasite vectors like mosquitoes. How-
ever, the genetics behind the transmission is non-Mendelian.
The fitness of offspring gets affected by the genotype of its
mother.
To understand the distortion in the Medea dynamics, first
we write a multiplayer game for Mendelian inheritance and
then distort it. From the point of view of an allele, it first
must be present in the company of another allele in the same
individual (maternal or paternal) and then when mating oc-
curs the interaction is with two other alleles contributed by
the mating partner, which ultimately results in only two al-
leles being transferred to the offspring. But first, the allele
has to take into account the effects of three other copies. In
situations where the genotype of the parents matters rather
than just the different genes contributed, there would be
loss of information when considering only the alleles. For
the alleles, we can write down a four-player game, in which
the payoffs for the alleles can be denoted as given by the
arrangement
AAA AAa Aaa aaa
A a3 a2 a1 a0
a b3 b2 b1 b0
(13)
The motivation behind this particular arrangement is that
even though we are looking at the frequencies of alleles,
the mating occurs between two diploid individuals. In mul-
tiplayer evolutionary game theoretic sense, this refers to a
game with two strategies with four players. The focal player
is the row player, and the combination of strategies possi-
ble for the remaining three players is given by the columns.
8This arrangement helps take into account all different pos-
sibilities or variations which can be introduced by random–
non-random mating, differential offspring survival or other
mechanisms which can bring about a change in the allele
frequencies.
Let the fitness of AA, Aa and aa be α, β and γ respec-
tively. We focus our attention though on the frequencies of
the alleles and analyse the dynamics of how they are affected
by this Darwinian fitness. The payoffs can be calculated as
follows. Consider the case of a1, i.e. an A allele interacting
with the three alleles Aaa.
When the focal A is paired with A then the remaining
alleles are aa. Mating between these two genotypes can
produce only heterozygote individuals with a fitness of β.
The other two possible combinations Aa×Aa produce one-
fourth AA homozygotes, one-fourth aa and half of Aa het-
erozygotes. Hence, of the A alleles in offsprings, half are
in AA and half in Aa therefore the fitness of the A allele
is (α + β)/2. Since there are two combinatorial possibili-
ties, we count this outcome twice. Finally, we add up all
the possible combinations, assuming random pairing and
mating, and we divide the outcome by the number of pos-
sibilities of pairing the focal A with Aaa, i.e. 3, in order to
obtain,
a1 =
β + (α+ β)/2 + (α+ β)/2
3
=
α+ 2β
3
. (14)
Similarly, we can write down the rest of the payoffs, which
ultimately give us the following payoff table,
AAA AAa Aaa aaa
A α 2α+β3
α+2β
3 β
a β 2β+γ3
β+2γ
3 γ
(15)
The average payoffs simplify and reduce to,
piA = αx+ β(1− x)
pia = βx+ γ(1− x) (16)
where x denotes the frequency of A allele. These payoffs
are often directly regarded as fitnesses in population genetics
[37]. In hindsight, then, we could have just made use of the
payoff matrix,
(A a
A α β
a β γ
)
(17)
which is how single-locus dynamics usually proceeds in evo-
lutionary game theory. Observe that even though the Dar-
winian fitnesses (genotypes) are frequency independent, the
allele fitnesses are not. However, recalling our analysis, we
see that this is just a special case of the four-player game
which is reduced to this form. The correspondence to two-
player games is a result of the usual Mendelian inheritance
seen in the example. To display the strength of the ap-
proach illustrated here, we discuss a case of non-Mendelian
inheritance, the Medea allele dynamics.
++ +M MM
++ ∼ ! ∼
+M ∼ ! ∼
MM ∼ ∼ ∼
The payoff matrix for neutrality:

p♂ q♂
p♀ 1 1
q♀ 1 1
. (1)
The payoff matrix for codominance:

p q
p 1 1− s/2
q 1− s/2 1− s
. (2)
The payoff matrix for underdominance:

p q
p 1 1− ω
q 1− ω 1
. (3)
♂♀
1
The payoff matrix for neutrality:

p♂ q♂
p♀ 1 1
q♀ 1 1
. (1)
The payoff matrix for codominance:

p q
p 1 1− s/2
q 1− s/2 1− s
. (2)
The payoff matrix for underdominance:

p q
p 1 1− ω
q 1− ω 1
. (3)
♂♀
1
++ die with probability t
∼ Normal offspring 
FIG. 2. The matings system of the individuals with the
medea system. The wildtype homozygotes are under a lethal-
ity risk only if their maternal parent had an M allele. Thus
the heterozygous females mate with wildtype homozygotes or
with heterozygote males then the wildtype homozygote off-
spring are eliminated with probability t. All other matings
can produce expected number of offsprings normally.
The Medea system shows a distortion in the number of
offsprings generated. Say the wild-type allele is denoted by
+ and the Medea allele is denoted by M . We assume the
fitness of the wild-type ++ to be 1 and that of the heterozy-
gote be ω and the Medea homozygotes have a fitness of ν.
In the Medea system if an offspring is a ++ homozygote but
its mother carries an M allele then the survival probability
of the ++ offspring is reduced by t, yielding 1− t.
Thus the Medea element plays its role in half the cases
of + +×+M and +M ×+M , as half the times the +M
will be a female and the fitness of the ++ offspring will be
1 − t. Applying this knowledge and the logic from above
for calculating the payoffs, we can write down a separate
matrix for the Medea system.
MMM MM+ M++ +++
M ν ω+2ν3
2ω+ν
3 ω
+ ω 2ω+1−t3
2+ω−t
3 1
(18)
Again, calculating and simplifying the payoffs give us the
following relations:
piM = νx+ ω(1− x)
pi+ = ωx+ (1− xt)(1− x) (19)
The non-linearity is brought about in the dynamics if the +
allele arises naturally from considering a four-player game.
Looking for a two-player game which reflects this scenario
would make the payoff entries themselves frequency depen-
dent.
9Handling complex genetic scenarios is a regular task for
multilocus population genetics theory [20, 34, 45, 77]. How-
ever, at the same time, it can be exceedingly complex and
daunting. We hope that bridging multilocus population ge-
netics and multiplayer evolutionary games may help transfer
simplicity of games to population genetics while taking into
account the complexity of realistic genetic architectures.
Social sciences
The field which has exploited the use of multiplayer game
to its fullest is social sciences. Working at the confluence of
behavioural economics with cognitive scientists, psycholo-
gists and biologists, the social sciences provide rich fields for
experimental as well as theoretical developments. Putting in
the biological aspect in such economic reasoning especially
helps in addressing the ultimate causes, the ‘why’ questions.
This advocates the use of evolutionary game theory in the
analysis rather than classical game theory based on ratio-
nality [120].
Addressing the evolution of cooperation has largely fol-
lowed from the analysis of the famous two-player Prisoners
Dilemma game [15]. However, in a social setting where
interactions take place between a number of participants,
the multiplayer version of the prisoners dilemma, the pub-
lic goods game, has been useful [62]. An increasing num-
ber of experimental as well as theoretical investigations
have brought into question the ubiquitousness of the Pub-
lic goods game based on the Prisoners Dilemma. In turn,
games such as the multiplayer stag hunt [133] are thought
to be appropriate in certain situations. Instead of think-
ing of these games as separate instances, Hauert et al. [64]
described them on a continuum of the so-called non-linear
public goods games. This approach was earlier explored for
a particular example of helping behaviour in [43]. Under-
standing the social context and making use of the appro-
priate approximation of interactions (the game) can lead to
interesting and complicated dynamics. Archetti and Scheur-
ing [11] present a review of such non-linear fitness functions
in public goods games. Also, the concept of a threshold
number of individuals required to generate a public benefit
was explored in a variety of social settings [18, 110, 135].
Such situations, which are impossible in two-player games,
have the potential to alter the evolutionary outcomes by in-
troducing new properties to the system such as threshold
values above which it is actually beneficial to cooperate.
Here, we discuss the non-linear social dilemmas as an
example of multiplayer games in the social sciences. Let
us begin with the linear public goods game. If there are
k cooperators in a group of d players, then they all pay a
cost c. Their contribution kc is multiplied and redistributed
equally amongst all the group members. The payoff for
a cooperator in this case is given by PC(k) = bk/d − c
where b is the multiplied benefit ( b = c×multiplier). The
defectors on the other hand do not contribute but get a
share of the benefit nevertheless. Thus, the payoff for a
defector is PD(k) = bk/d. Note that PC(k) is defined on
k = 1, 2, . . . , d while PD(k) is valid for k = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1.
Thus, for every mixed group, defectors are better off than
cooperators i.e. PD(k) > PC(k) for k = 1, 2, . . . , d− 1. In
randomly formed groups of size d the average fitness of the
cooperators and defectors is then given by,
fC =
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−kPC(k + 1) (20)
fD =
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−kPD(k) (21)
where x is the frequency of cooperators in the popula-
tions. Simplifying fD using PD(k) = bk/d we have,
fD =
b
d
d−1∑
k=0
(d− 1)!
(k − 1)!(d− 1− k)!x
k(1− x)d−1−k (22)
Multiplying and dividing by (d− 1)x we get,
fD =
b(d− 1)x
d
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 2
k − 1
)
xk−1(1− x)d−1−k = b(d− 1)x
d
.
(23)
In a similar way, it can be shown that fC = (b(x(d − 1) +
1)−cd)/d. We can actually recover the same fitnesses as of
the above system by making use of a simplified two-player
matrix given by
( C D
C b− c (b− cd)/d
D b(d− 1)/d 0
)
. (24)
This is owing to the fact that the payoff functions are linear
in the number of players, i.e. each cooperator contributed
by the same amount, and hence this effect can be studied
by a simplified matrix. Instead, the dilemma could involve
a non-linear payoff structure, for example each cooperator
could contribute more than the previous one depicting syner-
gistic interactions or with each cooperator the contributions
decline mimicking the saturating functions [64]. This ap-
proach can be included in the above framework by multiply-
ing the benefit produced by the synergy/discounting factor
as PD(k) = b(1−ωk)/(d(1−ω)) and PC(k) = PD(k)− c.
For ω → 1 we recover the linear public goods game and
the simplification to the two-player matrix. For synergy
(ω > 1) or discounting (ω < 1) we cannot simplify the
average fitnesses to any meaningful two-player interpreta-
tions. However, Pen˜a et al. [114] provide a very elegant
way to derive results directly from the game. Non-linear
public goods games provide a natural way to construct inter-
mediate cases between pure games such as the multiplayer
versions of Prisoners dilemma or the stag hunt or the snow-
drift game. While each of such pure games are amenable
to simplifications to a two-player matrix the intermediates
are not.
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DISCUSSION
Developments in evolutionary game theory are possible
because of a positive feedback loop between the theory and
its applications [29]. We have just touched upon only three
fields of applications of evolutionary games, but the neces-
sity of such tools in different fields will drive the need for
furthering the theory. For example, in ecology, the evolu-
tion of group size is still an open question which can be at
least proximately addressed by evolutionary games [14, 113].
Another interesting aspect is to work on the notion of mu-
tations. While usually mutations are assumed to happen
between existing types, completely novel mutations are hard
to capture [68]. Such mutations can also persist for long
in populations under certain conditions, and it would be
interesting to see how the possible stability conferred by
multiplayer games interacts with the dynamic stability of
multiple mutants. Furthermore, we have limited ourselves
to well-mixed populations and normal form games. Analy-
sis of multiplayer extensive form games is briefly mentioned
in [36]. The mathematics, however, becomes increasingly
complicated due to the multiple game trees which are pos-
sible due to the temporally distinct actions of multiple play-
ers. New methods [84] or a rediscovery of mathematical
techniques such as the use of Berstein polynomials [114]
can make the analysis of such complicated scenarios much
easier.
Some of the finite population results discussed earlier
have been extended to multiplayer games in structured pop-
ulations as well [153]. The coevolution of cooperation and
multiplayer interactions has been studied albeit in a spa-
tial context [2]. It is not possible to take into account here
the huge literature from evolutionary dynamics in structured
populations [28, 30, 102, 105, 107, 108, 125, 136, 151, 152]
which deserves a review of its own. Besides well-mixed and
structured populations, equilibrium selection can also be al-
tered by the process of random matching [119, 161] which
has been extended to three-player games [72].
While we can directly make use of multiplayer games to
survey the complex situations which nature has had to of-
fer, how do such social interactions come about in the first
place? Exploring the evolution of multiplayer games is a new
topic which may have implications for other concepts like
the evolution of grouping and multicellularity. Complicated
games can result in equally complicated or even chaotic
dynamics [53], thus putting to test the traditional concepts
of evolutionary stability and other equilibrium concepts. We
still believe that studying such complications arising via mul-
tiple players is a necessity. While the going gets tough, we
quote Paul Samuelson’s statement which may be valid for
any growing interdisciplinary field, “There is much territory
between economics and biology that is still virgin ground.
It will be tilled increasingly in the future. We should not be
surprised if the first explorations are both crude and preten-
tious. Wisdom and maturity are the last settlers to arrive
in pioneering communities.” [123].
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